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Not Cutting It: The Fourth Circuit's Misapplication of
Section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines in
Mobley v. United States*
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 to curtail
the amount of discretion federal judges possessed when sentencing
convicted criminals2 in an effort to reduce the disparity in sentencing
among similar crimes.3 With its 2005 decision in United States v.
Booker,' however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the once-
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were merely advisory.5
Booker marked a return to the pendulous pre-Sentencing Reform
Act world of judicial preference, where the sentencing philosophies of
individual judges carried significant weight.'
In Mobley v. United States,' Jermaine Mobley was serving a 151-
month sentence in federal prison for drug and weapon convictions.8
In September 2009, Mobley went to the prison infirmary after
complaining of numbness and pain in his feet.' While there, a physical
therapist picked up Mobley's shoe, only to have Mobley grab the shoe
and remove an eight-inch "shank""o from its insole, attempting
* Q 2013 Joseph T. Polonsky.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006)).
2. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1428 (2008) ("A paradigmatic example is the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, whose overriding purpose was to reduce inter-judge sentencing
disparity by reducing judicial discretion.").
3. See Editorial, Justice Pendulum Swings, N.Y. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at 30 ("Overly
lenient judges, of course, are a plague that prompted Congress to pass the 1984 Sentencing
Reform Act in the first place.").
4. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
5. See id. at 246 (striking down the mandatory sentencing requirements as
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, and instead opting to make the guideline
system simply advisory). But see id. at 311, 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority's holding will lead to "excessive sentencing disparities" and will "wreak havoc"
on the judiciary).
6. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665, 676
(2006) ("One clear effect of Booker, then, is to produce a greater degree of regional non-
uniformity in sentencing practices.").
7. 687 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 888 (2013).
8. Id. at 626.
9. Id.
10. Judge Wynn defines shanks as "crude homemade knives." Id. at 635 (Wynn, J.,
dissenting).
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unsuccessfully to hide the shank under an exam table before the
prison staff discovered it."
Subsequently, Mobley was arrested for, charged with, and pled
guilty to possession of a prohibited object in prison in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2).12 According to the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines, Mobley's offense warranted a sentence of between
twenty-four and thirty months imprisonment. 3  However, the
sentencing court enhanced Mobley's sentence pursuant to section
4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelinesl4 after finding that Mobley
qualified under the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) of having
committed a violent crime that automatically triggers a sentence
enhancement." Thereafter, the advisory sentencing range increased
to between thirty-seven and forty-six months, and the judge
sentenced Mobley to an additional thirty-seven months
imprisonment."
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Mobley showcases the problem
of judicial overreaching inherent in an overly discretionary sentencing
scheme. The court held by a split vote" that Mobley's possession of a
prohibited object in prison, namely a shank stored in the insole of his
shoe, constituted a "crime of violence" under the residual clause of
section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines sufficient to
enhance his sentence to the thirty-seven months Mobley received.'8
This Recent Development argues first that the Fourth Circuit
incorrectly decided Mobley by using a utilitarian theory of
punishment19 similar to that employed by the Fifth,2 0 Eighth,21 and
11. Id. at 626 (majority opinion).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 627.
14. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (2012) ("A defendant is
a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the
defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence
or a controlled substance offense.").
15. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 627. The term "crime of violence" is defined in the
Guidelines as any offense "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and
that is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. at
627-28 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 626-27.
17. Id. at 626.
18. Id. at 628.
19. Although reasonable minds certainly disagree on the effectiveness and validity of
utilitarian versus retributivist sentencing philosophies, this Recent Development takes the
position that a retributivist sentencing philosophy correctly reflects the goal Congress had
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Tenth 2  Circuits. The application of a utilitarian theory in this
circumstance is incorrect because it treats the crime of "possession of
a weapon" as an inchoate offense. Conversely, the more traditional,
retributivist philosophy applied by the Third Circuit" treats
"possession of a weapon" as too remote in time to be considered an
inchoate offense. 24
Secondly, this Recent Development argues that Mobley
exemplifies a larger problem, which the Guidelines intended to
correct, that still survives post-Booker: the residual clause of section
4B1.2(a)(2) provides too much leeway for judges to impose their
individual values on the sentencing process in direct contradiction to
the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.25 In fact, the
majority in Mobley incorrectly employed a utilitarian sentencing
philosophy because of this ambiguity. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the ambiguous residual clause in its 2008
decision Begay v. United States,26 lower courts have continued to
struggle to define "violent crimes" with regard to sentencing
enhancements. 27 This problem will continue until Congress revisits
to limit judicial discretion and normalize sentencing across judicial districts when it created
the Sentencing Guidelines. Since the late 1960s, indeterminate, utilitarian sentencing
guidelines that focused on rehabilitation and individualized sentencing have given way to
determinate, retributivist sentencing goals where the seriousness of the offense committed,
not the particular individual who committed the crime, determines the gravity of the
punishment. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 943,978-79 (1999).
20. See United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2010) (construing the
possession of a deadly weapon in prison as a crime of violence by looking at potential
future acts the possessor might commit).
21. See United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 712 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1002 (2012) (finding the defendant's possession of a deadly weapon in prison
constituted a violent crime because it enhanced the probability of future violent acts).
22. See United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011)
(reasoning that possession of a deadly weapon in prison constitutes a crime of violence
based on the "serious potential risk of physical injury").
23. See United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that
possession of a deadly weapon cannot serve as a predicate crime constituting a crime of
violence regardless of the inmate's intentions for the weapon).
24. See BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 1186-87 (9th ed. 2009) (defining an "inchoate
offense" as "[a] step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself being
serious enough to merit punishment. The three inchoate offenses are attempt, conspiracy,
and solicitation.").
25. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
26. 553 U.S. 137 (2008). The majority in Begay explained that Congress intended for
the residual clause to cover crimes similar "in kind as well as in degree of risk posed" to
"burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives." Id. at 137.
27. Compare Douglas J. Bench, Jr., What Constitutes a Violent Felony After Begay?,
67 J. Mo. B. 208, 208 (2011) (calling post-Begay sentencing a "counter-intuitive world of
sentencing pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984"), with Recent Case,
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the Guidelines to limit the discretionary power afforded sentencing
judges by removing the residual clause from the Sentencing Reform
Act, and in so doing, makes it clear that possession of a weapon is not
an inchoate offense.
Part I of this Recent Development considers how the Third,
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have interpreted the Guidelines'
problematic residual clause before comparing these interpretations to
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mobley. Part II analyzes the Fourth
Circuit's suspect treatment in Mobley of "possession of a weapon" as
an inchoate offense for sentence enhancement purposes in light of
constitutional notice requirement concerns and philosophically
competing sentencing theories. Part III highlights the issues created
by this clause by examining the suitability of the dissent's "rule of
lenity" analysis, particularly given that the Guidelines are advisory in
a post-Booker world. Finally, Part IV concludes by calling for
Congress to review the Guidelines to clarify the ambiguous residual
clause, in part by recognizing that "possession of a weapon" should
not be treated as an inchoate offense, as overly harsh sentences like
the one seen in Mobley are not consistent with constitutionally
mandated notice requirements or the purpose of the residual clause.
I. THE AMBIGUITY OF SECTION 4B1.2(A)(2) OF THE
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) defines a "crime of
violence" as any offense that "otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."'
Congress intended for these Guidelines to lessen the discretion of
federal judges.2 1 In so doing, Congress hoped to make federal
sentences more uniform across each jurisdiction and provide an
element of certainty in sentencing that did not previously exist" in an
Seventh Circuit Holds that Convictions for Failing to Report to Jail Constitute Violent
Felonies Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)-United States v. Golden, 120 HARV. L. REv. 2012,
2012 (2007) ("Though the phrase 'violent felony' may seem redundant in common
parlance, the law should be more discerning. The federal government uses this designation
for the purpose of sentencing enhancement, but courts have struggled to contain it. The
greatest source of trouble is a catch-all provision sweeping in all felonies that
'otherwise... presentf] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.' " (alterations
in original)).
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2012).
29. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006) (stating that the purposes of the United States
Sentencing Commission "are to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal
criminal justice system that . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
1440 [Vol. 91
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effort to ensure more equitable sentencing across the various
circuits." Congress may have meant to limit judicial discretion when
establishing the Guidelines, but that effort was not entirely successful.
While the imposition of mandatory minimum and mandatory
maximum sentences certainly accomplishes the goal of limiting
judicial discretion, the inclusion of the broad catch-all residual clause
in section 4B1.2(a)(2) gives judges the discretionary flexibility to
define what types of actions constitute violent crimes. Despite
Congress's intent, the inclusion of the residual clause of section
4B1.2(a)(2) only creates additional confusion highlighted by
application of the clause in Mobley3 2 and in other federal circuit
courts.
A. How the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits Interpret
4B1.2 (a) (2)
In United States v. Marquez,' the Fifth Circuit contended that
the similarities between the offenses of possession of a deadly weapon
by an inmate and burglary are both in kind and in degree of risk
posed." This is because, "[1]ike burglary, the 'main risk' of an inmate
in possession of a deadly weapon is 'the possibility of a face-to-face
confrontation' with another person."36
Similarly, in its decision in United States v. Boyce,37 the Eighth
Circuit concluded that "[t]here is no lawful purpose for an inmate to
possess an inherently dangerous weapon in a correctional facility.""
Adding to this trend, the Tenth Circuit, using Boyce as support,
concluded in United States v. Perez-Jiminez" that "possessing a
dangerous or deadly weapon in prison 'enables violence,' "40 and
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing
practices").
31. See Editorial, supra note 3, at 30 (taking a historic look at mandatory minimum
sentences and finding that "judges in different jurisdictions were handing down wildly
divergent sentences for the same crimes-leaving the system vulnerable to charges of
unequal application of the law").
32. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text; infra notes 35-50 and
accompanying text.
34. 626 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2010).
35. See id. at 222 (quoting United States v. Begay, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008)).
36. Id.
37. 633 F.3d 708 (8th Cir. 2011).
38. Id. at 711 (citation omitted).
39. 654 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2011).
40. Id. at 1143 (quoting Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712).
2013] 1441
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subsequently determined that possession of a deadly weapon by a
prison inmate is inherently a violent crime subject to an enhanced
sentence under section 4B1.2(a).41
Alternatively, the Third Circuit in United States v. Polk42 found
that, "[w]hile possessing a weapon in prison is purposeful, in that we
may assume one who possesses a shank intends that possession, it
cannot properly be characterized as conduct that is itself aggressive or
violent, as only the potential exists for aggressive or violent
conduct."43 Furthermore, the Polk court found:
While no doubt possession of a weapon in prison involves a
high degree of risk, Begay points out that even a serious
potential for injury is not enough to qualify a crime for career
offender enhancement; the risk created must also be "similar in
kind" to the crimes set out [in section 4B1.2(a)(2)]."
In essence, the Polk court based its argument on the premise that
possession alone cannot be violent, but rather only creates the
potential for violence.45 This application reflects the retributivist
philosophy that criminals should be punished only for the actions they
take, rather than for the potential damage their actions might cause.46
This is especially true when there is no indication that the criminal
action will have any future effects that might themselves be criminal,
as is the case in Mobley, where the facts do not indicate any plan
Mobley might have had to actively use the shank to incite or deter
violence.
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit's determination that the
location of the weapon bears significant weight in the analysis is
misguided. The Sentencing Commission classified unlawful
possession of the weapons enumerated in the guidelines as violent
crimes because of the "inherent dangerousness of the weapon-as
found by Congress-not where the weapon is possessed."47 Therefore,
the determination of "violent and aggressive" conduct, as required by
Begay, mandates that courts focus on the inherent dangerousness of a
41. Id. at 1143-44.
42. 577 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2009).
43. Id. at 519.
44. Id.
45. See id. ("The act of possession does not, without more ... involve any aggressive
or violent behavior." (quoting United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir.
2008))).
46. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING 110, 110 (Andrew Von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
47. United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 232 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. app. C at 134, amend. 674 (2010)).
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weapon, not the location where the weapon is found"8 as both the
Boyce and Mobley courts erroneously do.4 9
Contrary to the Third Circuit approach, Mobley joins the
approach embraced by the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.50 This
circuit split highlights the residual clause's problematic language' and
stresses the need for Congress to remove the residual clause from
section 4B1.2(a)(2) to eliminate continued confusion.
B. How the Fourth Circuit Split on 4B1.2(a) (2) in Mobley
In Mobley, the Fourth Circuit adopted particular aspects of the
reasoning employed by the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.12 As
noted above, these courts relied on the confusing post-Begay standard
that requires lower courts to determine how similar the enhancing
offense is to burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use
of explosives."
In his opinion for the majority, Judge King held that Mobley's
possession of the shank resembled the other enumerated offenses
present in section 4B1.2(a)(2), namely burglary. He posited that,
"[1]ike the offense of burglary of a dwelling, the availability of
contraband weapons in the prison context obviously facilitates
violence and injury." 54 Furthermore, King
readily agree[d] with the Tenth Circuit's summation in Perez-
Jiminez that '[t]here is no legitimate purpose for a prisoner to
carry a weapon designed to kill, injure or disable another. On
48. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
49. See United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2012) (basing the violent
and aggressive nature of possession of a prison shank on the determination of where the
shank was found: prison), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 888 (2013); United States v. Boyce, 633
F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 2011) ("There is no lawful purpose for an inmate to possess an
inherently dangerous weapon in a correctional facility."), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1002
(2012). The Mobley and Boyce majorities are not alone in their analysis that where the
weapon is found should be considered more than the inherent dangerousness of the
weapon itself. See United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2011)
("[There is no legitimate purpose for a prisoner to carry a weapon designed to kill, injure
or disable another."); Marquez, 626 F.3d at 225 (basing its decision on the potential
violence at risk because the defendant is in prison).
50. See Jeremy Bentham, Punishment and Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING,
supra note 46, at 53, 54 ("General prevention is effected by the denunciation of
punishment, and by its application, which, according to the common expression, serves for
an example.").
51. See id.
52. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 629-31.
53. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
54. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631 (other citations omitted) (citing Shrader v. White, 761
F.2d 975, 991 (4th Cir. 1985) (Sprouse, J., dissenting)).
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the contrary, the only reason to carry such a weapon is to use it
to attack another or to deter an attack.'55
In his dissent, Judge Wynn criticized the ambiguous nature of the
statute's definition of a "violent crime." Judge Wynn contended that
because of "the residual clause's ambiguity and the confusion
experienced, and created, by the courts, inmates lack sufficient notice
that simply possession of a shank constitutes a crime of violence."56
Most tellingly, Judge Wynn's criticism pointed to a scenario
presented at oral argument where the Government admitted that,
under its reasoning, which the majority subsequently adopted, a
shank discovered in the empty cell of an inmate would be
characterized as a "violent crime" subject to an enhanced sentence
under section 4B1.2(a)(2).1' This split among the Fourth Circuit panel
further reveals the philosophical divide present between retributivists
and utilitarians as it pertains to the classification of possession of a
weapon as a violent crime.
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S SUSPECT TREATMENT OF "POSSESSION
OF A WEAPON" AS AN INCHOATE OFFENSE AND THE UNDERLYING
PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The two-to-one split among judges on the Mobley court aligns
with a difference in underlying, competing sentencing philosophies."
This split embodies the sentencing problems that have arisen since
Booker rendered the Guidelines merely advisory." In Mobley, the
defendant received an enhanced sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines after the sentencing court determined that possession of a
shank by a prison inmate constituted a crime of violence under
section 4B1.2(a)(2). Under the auspices of discretion in sentencing
and motivated by a utilitarian sentencing philosophy, Judge King's
majority opinion equates possession of a dangerous weapon in the
55. Id. (quoting United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2011)).
56. Id. at 636 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 634.
58. Compare infra Part III.A (analyzing Mobley from the majority's utilitarian
perspective), with infra Part III.B (analyzing Mobley from the dissent's retributivist
perspective).
59. See E.J. (Evelio Jesds) Yera, Blakely, Apprendi, Booker, Begay, and Santos:
Judicial Minimalism and the U.S. Supreme Court's Ill-Conceived Attempts at a Rational
Jurisprudence, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 87, 97 (2009) (finding that various post-Booker
sentencing challenges resulting in "a windfall for defendants" came as a result of the
uncertainty created by Booker).
60. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 627-28.
1444 [Vol. 91
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context of a prison setting to an inchoate offense." The majority uses
the prison setting to justify an otherwise incorrect interpretation of
possession as an inchoate crime in hopes that enhanced punishments
will deter future criminal possession by prison inmates. Utilitarians,
like the majority in Mobley, justify punishment as a means to deter
future crime by both the immediate offender and potential future
offenders. 62 Thus, Judge King erroneously conflates the potential for
violence created by mere possession itself with an actual violent
crime.
Conversely, Judge Wynn's dissent embodies a retributivist
sentencing philosophy' that refuses to conflate the potential risk of
violence with violent conduct for the purpose of punishment.' A
retributivist, like Judge Wynn in Mobley, looks backward in time to
justify punishment because "[ilt is morally fitting that an offender
should suffer in proportion to [his] desert or culpable wrongdoing.""6
The retributivist is unconcerned with any deterrent effects the
punishment may have in the future.' These philosophical differences
are heightened by the unconstitutional sentence enhancement that
results from the majority's treatment of mere possession of a weapon
as a violent crime. Moreover, these differences also highlight the
problems associated with the post-Booker return to discretionary
sentencing Congress attempted to curtail with the Sentencing Reform
Act.
61. See id. at 631-32.
62. See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory
and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 320 (1984).
63. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631-32 (concluding that the potential risk posed by
possession of a shank in prison constitutes a crime of violence under the residual clause of
section 4B1.2(a)(2)).
64. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism and the State's Interest in Punishment, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII, at 156, 158-59 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman, eds. 1985) ("[Tlhe retributivist seeks, not primarily for the socially useful
punishment, but for the just punishment, the punishment that the criminal (given his
wrongdoing) deserves or merits, the punishment that society has a right to inflict and the
criminal a right to demand."); see also Andrew Von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 46, at 115, 119 ("Equity is sacrificed when the
proportionality principle is disregarded, even when this is done for the sake of crime
prevention.").
65. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 632 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (noting that the possession of a
shank is too dissimilar to the violent offenses enumerated in the relevant provision of
4B1.2(a)(2) to justify the majority's determination that possession of a shank in prison is a
violent crime subject to a sentence enhancement).
66. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 860 (2002).
67. See id. at 859-60.
2013] 1445
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III. POSSESSION Is NOT AN INCHOATE OFFENSE
An inchoate offense is "[a] step toward the commission of
another crime, the step in itself being serious enough to merit
punishment.""6 Society punishes inchoate offenses when the actor's
conduct reflects a firm commitment to commit harm,69 even though
the harm has not yet resulted. That is, society punishes a wrongdoer
for an incomplete offense because it determines that the potential risk
for harm arises to a level meriting public admonishment." Successful,
completed crimes are usually punished more severely than inchoate,
incomplete crimes because the social harm of a completed crime is
perceived to outweigh the social harm present in an incomplete
offense."
Recognized inchoate crimes are conspiracy, attempt, and
solicitation.7 2 Possession is an altogether different offense in which
society punishes an actor for having, either constructively or
physically, certain prohibited articles.7 3 Possession is not punished
based on an overt action leading toward the commission of another
crime like inchoate offenses,74 but rather because the wrongdoer
unlawfully possesses a prohibited article." Possession may be
punishable separately and prior to any conduct constituting an
inchoate offense.7
Conflating possession with inchoate offenses creates serious due
process concerns. "A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1186-87 (9th ed. 2009).
69. Michael T. Cahill, Defining Inchoate Crime: An Incomplete Attempt, 9 OHIo ST. J.
CRIM. L. 751,755 (2012).
70. See id.
71. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1
(1994) (recognizing that, under the Model Penal Code, which generally "prescribes the
same punishment for attempts as for successes, murder receives more punishment than
attempted murder," and that "most states go beyond the Model Penal Code in more
severely punishing successful crimes").
72. See supra note 24; see also Williams v. United States, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008)
(noting that attempt and conspiracy, in addition to solicitation, are inchoate offenses).
73. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 300 (defining inchoate crimes as "acts looking toward the
commission of another crime"); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTlONARY 1281-83 (9th ed.
2009) (defining possessory crimes).
74. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (finding that the agreement to
commit an unlawful act is the actus reus required to punish an inchoate offense).
75. See generally United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d. Cir. 2011) (finding
constitutional a prohibition on gun possession and enforcing that prohibition simply
because the defendant had actual possession of the weapon).
76. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Inchoate Crimes at the Prevention/Punlshment
Divide, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2011) (giving a hypothetical where an actor
may be punished for possession as a preparatory offense although the conduct does not
yet constitute an attempt).
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against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense .. . are
basic in our system of jurisprudence."7  Although imprisoned,
inmates retain certain due process rights enumerated in the
Constitution, including but not limited to a protected liberty
interest.7 9 An inmate is constitutionally entitled to protection of a
state-created liberty interest "where the State's action will inevitably
affect the duration of his sentence."' In the context of Mobley, the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution should have protected
Mobley from being punished for an inchoate offense after being
convicted of possession of a prohibited object in prison. "Approving
the enforcement of a sentencing statute that does not 'give a person
of ordinarily intelligence fair notice' of its reach, and that permits,
indeed invites, arbitrary enforcement" is unconstitutional." The
equation of possession of a weapon with an inchoate offense results in
the punishment of possession under the guise of an inchoate offense,
effectively allowing courts to punish wrongdoers guilty of possession
as if they had committed an inchoate offense.
A. Mobley's Enhancement and the Majority's Utilitarian Perspective
1. The Utilitarian Sentencing Philosophy and the
Residual Clause
The majority's mischaracterization of possession of a weapon as
a violent crime is grounded in a utilitarian sentencing philosophy
aimed at deterring similar acts.8 2 In the context of Mobley, this
deterrent-based philosophy is inherently problematic. In conflating
the potential for violence presented by a prisoner's possession of a
shank in prison with an actually violent action, like stabbing, the
majority implemented a utilitarian sentencing philosophy focused
77. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
78. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,220-
24 (2005) (determining that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the government from infringing on a prisoner's liberty interest
without due process of law).
79. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 220-24.
80. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (ruling that defendant Conner's
situation did not present a case where the state action would undoubtedly affect the length
of his sentence).
81. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the vague and arbitrary nature of the residual clause).
82. See generally Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 46, at 39, 40
("Special deterrence is aimed at the particular offender before the court; general
deterrence seeks to influence the behaviour of other potential offenders in the population.
Both objectives employ the mechanism of fear: the threat of punishment (or further
punishment in the case of individual deterrence) acts as a deterrent.").
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primarily on potential consequences that may not come to pass.83
Underlying the Mobley majority's holding, then, is a belief that
enhancement here was justified because the crime of possession took
place inside prison walls.' This position cannot be sustained.
The majority's reliance on its utilitarian punishment theory is
made possible by the ambiguous nature of the residual clause of
section 4B1.2(a)(2). 5 Section 4B1.2(a) defines a crime of violence as
one that
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is
burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another."
This language has prompted the Supreme Court to adopt a piecemeal
approach to determine what is and is not a violent crime under the
residual clause." On certain occasions, the Court has taken a
categorical approach whereby it compares an unenumerated offense
to those offenses enumerated as violent crimes in section
4B1.2(a)(2)." Additionally, the Court has found that violent crimes
83. See Matthew Haist, Deterrence in a Sea of "Just Deserts": Are Utilitarian Goals
Achievable in a World of "Limiting Retributivism"?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789,
794 (2009) (noting that "utilitarian theories are sometimes referred to as 'consequentialist'
because they are concerned solely with how punishment will affect future actions and with
society's future aggregate happiness").
84. See United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 631-32 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 888 (2013). The majority provides further evidence that it intended to limit its
holding to a prison setting by recognizing that unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon
does not constitute a violent crime subject to sentence enhancement. Id. at 628-29 (citing
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2012)).
85. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
86. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2).
87. See generally Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (recognizing the
categorical approach taken previously as well as the Begay test but favoring a conduct-
based approach to determine whether felony vehicle flight is properly categorized as a
violent felony); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (furthering the categorical
approach method); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (creating the test that
requires violent crimes to be "purposeful, violent, and aggressive"); James v. United
States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (taking a categorical approach to determine whether Congress
sought to exclude particular offenses from the residual clause in 4B1.2(a)(2)).
88. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 126 (holding that the categorical approach requires
sentencing courts to consider the generic nature of the crime committed rather than the
specific nature of the crime before it); James, 550 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(defining the majority's categorical approach as one where "the sentencer should compare
the unenumerated offense at issue with the 'closest analog' among the four offenses that
are set forth (burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives), and
should include the unenumerated offense within ACCA if the risk it poses is
'comparable' ").
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4B1.2(a) (2)
are those crimes that are "purposeful, violent, and aggressive."'
However, the Supreme Court has also recognized a conduct-based
approach whereby actions that create a substantial risk to others may
be punished as violent crimes under the residual clause.90 The current
circuit split in interpreting this residual clause is a direct result of the
Supreme Court's inability to identify a bright-line rule based on
guidelines that invite arbitrary judicial discretion in direct
contradiction to congressional purpose." In Mobley, the Fourth
Circuit, being able to use the utilitarian sentencing philosophy in part
because of the ambiguity of the residual clause, incorrectly applies all
three of these tests to determine when a crime is violent under the
residual clause.
2. The Majority's Incorrect Application of the
Categorical Approach
In part, the Mobley majority relies on a misinterpretation of
Begay v. United States. In Begay, the Supreme Court held that the
felony offense of driving under the influence of alcohol is not a
violent felony subject to an enhanced sentence.' The Court held that
an unenumerated offense would fall within the purview of the
residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) if it is "similar, in kind as well as
in degree of risk posed, to the examples"" given in that section,
namely burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of
explosives.94
The Mobley court fails to establish that possessing a shank is a
crime Congress intended to punish in the residual clause of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Begay requires the offense in question to be
similar in kind and in degree of risk posed to the enumerated offenses
put forth in section 4B1.2(a)(2) before enhancement is allowed.95 The
majority contends that possession of a shank by an inmate in prison
"involve[s] a similar level of potential violence and aggression
reflected in the possession of the weapons, such as a sawed-off
shotgun, specified in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)."9 6 Despite this assertion,
89. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145.
90. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274 (finding that "[r]isk of violence is inherent to vehicle
flight," the crime committed by Sykes).
91. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
92. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 139.
93. Id. at 143.
94. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2012).
95. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 142-43.
96. See United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 888 (2013).
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the opinion gives little guidance as to why a prison shank and a
sawed-off shotgun are similar in kind and degree of risk posed.97 In
comparing the criminal possession of a sawed-off shotgun with that of
a shank by a prison inmate, the majority argues that "[b]oth of these
crimes prohibit the possession of dangerous weapons in contexts
where they have no lawful purpose.""
This argument falls flat, however, because, as the majority also
makes clear, not all unlawful possessions of a firearm constitute a
"crime of violence" under the language of the Sentencing
Guidelines." Thus, the majority fails to determine what makes
unlawful possession of some, but not all, firearms "crimes of
violence." Without this determination, the majority cannot properly
explain why criminal possession of a shank by a prison inmate is
similar in kind and in degree of risk posed to criminal possession of a
sawed-off shotgun. This reading of Begay highlights that the majority
is basing its sentencing decision solely on a utilitarian philosophy,
which aims to punish Mobley not for his actual conduct, but rather for
the potential risk that possession of a shank in prison poses."
Ultimately, the Mobley court unsuccessfully attempts to soothe
the utilitarian sting of its holding and its reading of Begay by limiting
the enhancement penalty to possessions of weapons that take place in
the prison setting.'0' Judge King supports his utilitarian perspective
on sentencing by noting that " '[t]here is no legitimate purpose for a
prisoner to carry a weapon designed to kill, injure or disable another.
On the contrary, the only reason to carry such a weapon is to use it to
attack another or to deter an attack.' "102 Though Judge King
"recognize[s] that 'it is virtually impossible to eliminate violence
among the incarcerated,' "103 his opinion errs on the side of an
enhanced penalty in a situation in which the crime involved no actual
or threatened violence simply because it happened inside prison
97. See id. (comparing the crimes of possessing sawed-off shotguns and possessing
prison shanks only to the extent that they "prohibit the possession of dangerous weapons
in contexts where they have no lawful purpose").
98. Id.
99. Id. at 629 (limiting the type of firearm for purposes of section 4B1.2 to those
firearms, like the sawed-off shotgun, described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (2006)).
100. Id. at 631-32 ("We are therefore firmly of the view that Mobley's offense of
conviction 'presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,' and that his
offense of conviction constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender
enhancement." (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2012))).
101. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
102. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 631 (quoting United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136,
1143 (10th Cir. 2011)).
103. Id. at 631 (quoting Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 273 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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walls. Thus, in order to justify the enhanced sentence here, the
majority equates mere possession of a weapon with actual violence,
focusing on the lack of legitimate purpose for having a shank in
prison.
This is inconsistent with congressional purpose-to define
certain crimes as particularly violent such that an enhanced sentence
is merited'"-as well as with the Supreme Court's determination in
Begay that the crime must be "similar, in kind as well as in degree of
risk posed, to the examples" given in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the
Sentencing Guidelines."o As Judge Wynn notes:
The statutory purpose of the career offender provision, as
expressed in its title, is to provide enhanced sentencing for
career criminals. Yet nothing indicates that prisoners who
possess shanks are career offenders engaged in violent crimes,
as opposed to, e.g., ordinary inmates in jail on non-violent drug
charges with a crude weapon made for self-defense purposes
only. 106
Furthermore, the majority incorrectly categorizes mere possession as
an inchoate violent crime, improperly conflating the possession with
an "act[] looking toward the commission of another crime."1o7 This
inconsistency could easily be resolved by removing the residual clause
from the Guidelines, leaving instead the clearly enumerated crimes
that constitute violent crimes for enhanced sentencing purposes.
3. The Majority's Incorrect Application of the "Purposeful,
Violent, and Aggressive" Approach
The majority also fails to establish that Mobley's possession of
the shank was purposeful. Under the Court's decision in Begay, an
enhancing offense derived from the residual clause of 4B1.2(a)(2)
must be "purposeful, violent, and aggressive."" The "purposeful"
104. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) ("If Congress meant... the
statute to be all-encompassing, it is hard to see why it would have needed to include the
examples at all.").
105. Id. at 143.
106. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
107. Williams v. United States, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008). For further information,
compare this Supreme Court definition of an inchoate offense with the Mobley court's
treatment of Mobley's sentence enhancement. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 632 n.7 ("The residual
clause encompasses conduct that creates a serious potential risk of injury to another, and,
as we have already explained, the possession of a shank in prison plainly creates such a
risk.").
108. Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45 (requiring enhancement offenses to be "purposeful,
violent, and aggressive"). As will be shown below, mere possession of a shank in prison by
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requirement speaks to the specific mens rea a person must have
before an enhanced punishment is merited."o' The purposeful mens
rea element is achieved "with respect to a result if [a person's]
conscious objective is to cause such a result."no Purposeful and
knowingly are distinct levels of criminal culpability,"' and an actor
cannot be convicted of a statute requiring a "purposeful" level of
mens rea if only "knowingly" is proved.
At oral argument in Mobley, the Government effectively
conceded that inmates who are "knowingly" in possession of shanks
in prison could be held liable,112 an argument that the majority did not
repudiate. The attachment of "knowingly" as the mens rea to
possessory crimes committed under 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2)'1 3 by
inmates is consistent with its application elsewhere.114 Mobley's
culpability level, therefore, does not clearly rise to the level Begay
requires. Although at least one other circuit court decision upon
which the Fourth Circuit's decision relies questions whether
possession of a shank in prison is a "violent crime" according to the
Begay standard," 5 the Fourth Circuit only used Begay to justify its
an inmate is neither violent nor aggressive under a correct application of Begay in light of
relevant congressional intent. See infra Part III.B. However, because the majority's
analysis fails to adequately demonstrate that Mr. Mobley's conduct is purposeful, it is not
necessary to analyze the violence or the aggressiveness of the possessory offense here.
109. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45. The Begay majority provided multiple examples
that demonstrate the intention for "purposeful" to reflect the mental state of the offender.
Id. at 145 (providing that "burglary" is with "intent to commit a crime"; "arson" is "with
the purpose of"; and "extortion" is "purposely obtaining property" (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 815,818-19 (1980).
111. See id. ("People act 'purposely' with respect to a result if their conscious objective
is to cause such a result. People act 'knowingly' with respect to the result if it is not their
conscious objective, yet they are practically certain or aware of a high probability that
their conduct will cause the result.").
112. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the Government
conceded at oral argument that its reasoning would allow prosecutors to seek enhanced
sentencing of an inmate if a shank is discovered in his cell during a search for which he is
not even present.").
113. Mobley was originally convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2006). Id. at
626 (majority opinion).
114. United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1139 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011)
("Although the statute does not contain an express mens rea element, we have held that'a
violation of section 1791 must be committed knowingly.' " (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Fox, 845 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1988)
("Accordingly, we must conclude that the language of § 1791(a) indicates that Congress
intended the mens rea element of the crime set forth in § 1791(a)(2) to be a 'knowing' or
'intentional' state of mind.").
115. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1142 n.4 ("As noted, 18 U.S.C. § 1791 requires a
'knowing' mens rea. Therefore, although we do not decide the question, Begay's
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affirmation of the sentencing court's decision in Mobley by
incorrectly equating "knowingly" with the "purposeful" mens rea
requirement Begay demands.
4. The Majority's Misapplication of the Conduct-Based Approach
Although less extensively than on Begay, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis depends in part on Sykes v. United States,"' which takes the
conduct-based approach to determine if a crime is one of violence
under the residual clause by asking whether "[s]erious and substantial
risks are .. . inherent" to the committed crime."
In Sykes, the Supreme Court compared the degree of risk of
intentional vehicular flight to the degree of risk in the enumerated
offenses, holding that the inherent risk of violence of intentional
vehicular flight is at least as great as that of burglary and arson, two
enumerated offenses."' In Mobley, the Fourth Circuit compared the
possession of the shank with the enumerated offense of burglary,
finding that possession of a weapon in prison enables violence, and
similar to burglary, "the main risk of an inmate in possession of a
deadly weapon is the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation with
another person."119
However, as Judge Wynn points out in his dissent, "there is a
fundamental difference between the 'purposeful, violent, and
aggressive' enumerated offenses and the 'passive crime[]' of mere
possession."20 The majority erroneously substitutes the risk of any
future violence that may occur for the inaction that mere possession
of the weapon presents. That is, from a conduct-based approach, it is
incorrect to equate the conduct of simply possessing a weapon with
conduct that involves the active use of that weapon.
'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test ... may no longer apply to offenses like the one
at issue here." (citation omitted)). In Perez-Jiminez, the Tenth Circuit relied on its own
precedent that allowed it to make a conduct-specific inquiry into whether the defendant's
possession of a shank in prison constituted a "crime of violence" under section
4B1.2(a)(2). Id. at 1140. It may be assumed from the lack of any similar analysis that the
Mobley majority could not make an argument analogous to Perez-Jiminez's conduct-
specific inquiry for want of similar jurisdictionally specific precedent.
116. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
117. See id. at 2276.
118. See id. at 2274-75.
119. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 630 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. Id. at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519
(3d Cir. 2009)).
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B. Mobley's Enhancement from the Dissent's Retributivist
Perspective
Distinct from the utilitarian notion of general deterrence 2 ' is the
retributivist philosophy that the only necessary justification for
punishment is that offenders merit the "just desserts" of their
actions.' That is, society punishes only because "[i]t is morally fitting
that an offender should suffer in proportion to [his] desert or culpable
wrongdoing."123
First, Judge Wynn's dissent'24 follows this classical, retributivist
sentencing philosophy by refusing to categorize the potential risks of
harm presented by "mere possession" as a "crime of violence."12 In
rebutting the majority's supposition that possession of a shank in
prison constitutes "purposeful, violent, and aggressive" conduct as
required by Begay, Judge Wynn vis-A-vis the Supreme Court's
decision in Chambers v. United States26 concludes that where a
"crime amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry from the 'purposeful,
violent, and aggressive' conduct potentially at issue when an offender
[commits one of the enumerated offenses in 4B1.2(a)(2)]," the
passivity of the crime in question must render the crime nonviolent.2 7
It follows that "[p]risoners [like Mobley] charged with possession
alone need not have attempted, or even threatened, to harm
anyone."" It has been posited that "[b]y most standards of
proximity, none of [the possession] offenses would constitute an
attempt to commit a specific completed crime. The act of obtaining [a
dangerous weapon] comes at least a step prior to the act of using it to
commit a crime."129
Moreover, Judge Wynn's dissent refutes the argument "that the
prison context somehow transforms a shank into an extremely
dangerous weapon" because prisoners are not lawfully allowed to
121. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 197-98
(Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887) (arguing that the only punishment permitted
for murder is execution of the murderer).
123. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 843,860 (2002).
124. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 632-37 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 632.
126. 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (addressing whether the defendant's failure to report for
confinement constituted a violent crime under the Sentencing Guidelines).
127. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 633 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Chambers, 555 U.S. at
128).
128. Id. at 634 (footnote omitted).
129. Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 100 (1989).
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possess weapons, regardless of purpose.3 0 In so doing, Judge Wynn
points out the problems with disparate and overly discretionary
sentencing that the controversial residual clause imputes on federal
sentencing jurisprudence, which has been criticized elsewhere as "ad
hoc judgment[s] that will sow further confusion.""' As noted by the
majority, Congress did not intend for possession of any weapon to
constitute a violent crime,'32 but rather, as the dissent notes, limited
its focus to "inherently dangerous" weapons that "serve only violent
purposes" when possessed unlawfully."' Not only are shanks not
included on the list promulgated in the Sentencing Guidelines,'3 4 but
also shanks "are entirely dissimilar to the weapons that are
included.""' The dissent in United States v. Marquez' 6 aptly noted
that "the definition of the [relevant] offense of possession of a deadly
weapon by an inmate ... clearly makes it a purely passive, possessory
crime, requiring no ... violence or aggression.""' The determination
of "violent and aggressive" conduct, as required by Begay, mandates
that courts focus on the inherent dangerousness of a weapon, not the
location where the weapon is found as the Mobley majority
erroneously does.
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF MOBLEY
Absent congressional intervention to clarify the sentencing
guidelines, the "rule of lenity" should apply to disfavor enhancements
in situations like that faced by Mobley. The following two subsections
address (1) the applicability of the rule of lenity in this context and
(2) a proposed legislative solution to resolve the circuit split in a
manner that maintains the original congressional intent of limiting
judicial discretion.
130. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also id. at 635 (stating that the
possession of a shank in prison by a non-violent offender for the sole purpose of self-
defense does not fit within the purpose of the statute at issue).
131. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 629.
133. Id. at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214,
232 (5th Cir. 2010) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (refuting the majority's determination that
possession of a cudgel made of dried paper magazine is a crime of violence under the
residual clause)).
134. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2012) (listing "a
sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun" as examples of
weapons whose possession qualifies as a violent crime).
135. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
136. 626 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2010).
137. Id. at 232 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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A. The Court's Solution: The Rule of Lenity
By invoking the rule of lenity to solve the due process concerns
that arise out of the vagueness and ambiguity of the residual clause,
the courts could prevent the sentences of people like Mobley from
being unfairly enhanced. The "policy of lenity means that the Court
will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the
penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation
can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended."' Where two reasonable interpretations exist to explain an
otherwise ambiguous statute, the interpretation most beneficial to the
defendant should prevail."' As the Supreme Court has noted,
"Where Congress has manifested its intention, [the Court] may not
manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that intent." 4 0 Conversely,
where the purpose of a penal statute is ripe with ambiguity, "[tihe
rule of lenity serves as an important safeguard of defendants'
constitutional rights by ensuring that they receive notice" 41 as
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'42
Judge Wynn correctly argued that the Fourth Circuit should have
applied the rule of lenity here, thereby construing the ambiguous
residual clause in favor of Mobley.'43
Judge Wynn's discussion of the rule of lenity focused primarily
on how the return to autonomous judicial discretion post-Booker
coupled with ambiguity in the sentence enhancement statute leads
judges to issue unfair sentences. It is clear that, "[w]hen a penal
statute is ambiguous, [the Fourth Circuit is] 'obliged to apply the rule
of lenity and resolve the conflict in the defendant's favor.' "'" After
the Supreme Court decided Booker, the mandatory sentences
promulgated by the Sentencing Guidelines became merely
138. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980).
139. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (citing Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)) (stating that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity").
140. Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
141. United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 888 (2013).
142. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding unconstitutional a
"criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute").
143. See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 636 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also United States v, Munn,
595 F.3d 183, 194 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that "in the face of any such ambiguity, [the
court] would be obliged to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the conflict in the
defendant's favor").
144. Mobley, 687 F.3d at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Munn, 595 F.3d at 194).
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advisory.'45 Data collected shortly after Booker indicated that the
now-discretionary nature of federal sentencing led federal district
court judges to err on the side of severity rather than lenity in their
sentencing decisions. 146 However, the advisory nature of the
Sentencing Guidelines does not eliminate the possibility that the rule
of lenity might be applied in particular circumstances. Therefore, the
increased discretion afforded to trial court judges should not limit the
ability of a reviewing appellate court to invoke the rule of lenity to
decrease a defendant's sentence. The Mobley majority's failure to
address the rule of lenity does a profound disservice to solving the
problem of the ambiguous nature of the residual clause in section
4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines.
It is important that the rule of lenity be applied in cases like
Mobley for a variety of reasons. As discussed, the retributivist
sentencing philosophy makes more sense in the context of Mobley
than the majority's use of a utilitarian viewpoint.147 The application of
the rule of lenity in the context of the ambiguity present in the
residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) ensures that the sentences of
defendants like Mobley are not unjustly and unlawfully enhanced in
an effort to deter similar offenses in the future. Instead, the rule of
lenity will ensure that defendants like Mobley are punished only for
the actions they have been found guilty of committing. As previously
noted, the majority in Mobley incorrectly confuses the location of the
weapon with the inherent dangerousness posed by a rudimentary,
homemade knife.1"' Furthermore, the majority's characterization of
possession as an inchoate offense improperly turns a passive crime
into an action resembling a more active offense like attempt.
Applying the rule of lenity in this context would avoid this flawed
interpretation.
Next, in light of the overly ambiguous nature of the residual
clause at issue in Mobley, Judge Wynn's plea to apply the rule of
lenity highlights that ambiguity and places Congress on notice that its
legislation has potential constitutional notice issues that need to be
addressed. Congress should read cases decided on the basis of the
145. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
146. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV.
155, 167-68 (2005).
147. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, Fault Lines in the Clean Water Act: Criminal
Enforcement, Continuing Violations, and Mental State, 33 ENVTL. L. 173, 201 (2003) ("The
rule of lenity in [the context of the enforcement of the Clean Water Act] fulfills retributive
motives because it ensures that only those aware of moral wrongdoing in a somewhat
traditional sense will be . .. treated accordingly.").
148. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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rule of lenity to implement proactive measures that ensure that its
legislation complies with the Constitution. Conversely, Congress's
failure to thus far address the ambiguity readily identifiable in the
residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) will result in the continued
conflation of piecemeal approaches that would force the Supreme
Court to make "dozens of grants of certiorari, to allocate all the
Nation's crimes" as being either violent or non-violent, 4 9 while at the
same time failing to address the continued uncertainty as to whether a
defendant's constitutional right to notice has been violated.
The indefinite nature of-what constitutes a "violent crime" within
the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) highlights the ambiguity
present within that definition. This is evidenced by the varying tests
employed' and results reached."' Because the Guidelines are
ambiguous, "inmates lack sufficient notice that simple possession of a
shank constitutes a crime of violence," 15 2 and the Fourth Circuit is
therefore obligated to apply the rule of lenity to protect Mr. Mobley's
constitutional rights. While the application of the rule of lenity should
have prevented the Fourth Circuit from enhancing Mobley's
sentence, the invocation of the rule of lenity is merely a stopgap
measure that offers case-by-case corrections but fails to
comprehensively address the underlying problem-the ambiguous
nature of the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2). A complete
overhaul of jurisprudence involving the residual clause could render
the clause moot if courts applied the rule of lenity across the board,
ruling in favor of the defendant each time the residual clause was at
issue. This draconian method would effectively overrule the various
approaches the Court has taken to address the clause. However, it
would secure a bright line for lower courts to use as guidance when
determining what crimes are considered violent under the Sentencing
Reform Act. Subsequently, Congress could either act to clarify the
controversial residual clause or allow the courts to proceed with only
the enumerated offenses recognized as violent crimes. Nevertheless,
congressional action still remains the most sensible means for
addressing the ambiguity in the residual clause, even if it is not the
most likely means for doing so.
149. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 216 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See discussions supra Parts III.A.1, 1Il.B.
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 636 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 888 (2013).
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B. The Congressional Fix: Deleting the Residual Clause
Judge Wynn rightly points out the problematic nature of the
residual clause at issue in Mobley. This clause "calls out for legislative
clarification"" and has been criticized as a "drafting failure [that
should be] declare[d] void for vagueness.""' Indeed, "[i]t will take
decades, and dozens of grants of certiorari, to allocate all the Nation's
crimes to one or the other side of this ... entirely indeterminate
line."' The arbitrary, ad hoc determinations by the various circuit
courts of what constitutes a "violent crime" will continue for the
foreseeable future if Congress does not revisit the ambiguity in the
residual clause.
It is well within the power of Congress to revisit previously
passed legislation containing ambiguous language for the purposes of
providing clarity. Although the residual clause "may be a poorly
drafted statute[,] ... rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it is so
inclined, and not for [the Supreme Court]."l56 Indeed, the Court's
denial of certiorari'57 further indicates that the proper place for
revision is with Congress. Should Congress decide to revisit the
residual clause, it would be particularly instructive to consider that
possession is not an inchoate crime and should not be punished as
such,"' and that the post-Booker advisory nature of the Sentencing
Guidelines"' calls out for an increased amount of specificity for the
types of crimes that merit an enhanced sentence.
The easiest, most effective method for addressing the ambiguous
nature of the residual clause is to simply remove the clause from the
Guidelines. By removing the controversial residual clause from the
Guidelines, Congress would eliminate the ambiguity while still
effectively enhancing sentences for violent, career offenders. The
Guidelines would still recognize a violent crime as one that "(1) has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives," 6 o but it would
not require courts to rewrite the statute each time an unlisted,
153. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 155 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
154. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 216 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the lack of guidance in the majority's opinion).
156. H.J. Inc. v Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (critiquing the poorly
drafted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act).
157. Mobley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 888 (2013).
158. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
160. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
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potentially violent crime has been committed by a career offender.
Judges would not have the discretion to improperly elevate
possession to the level of an inchoate offense like the majority did in
Mobley.16 1
Congress likely included the residual clause as a catch-all on
which judges could rely to supplement the enumerated offense with
those other, unlisted violent offenses. Most likely, Congress did not
want to box itself into a corner where an unenumerated offense was
so heinously violent that the offender could not be punished
accordingly. While this rationale is reasonable, the subsequent
application of the residual clause has resulted in the various muddled,
disjointed standards put forth by the Supreme Court. Removing the
residual clause would not allow an offender to avoid punishment.
Rather, it simply requires that the offender of an unenumerated
offense be punished for that crime without receiving an enhanced
sentence. Moreover, the crossover between the violent felonies
enumerated in section 4B1.2(a)(2) and the federal habitual offender
laws indicates that courts could continue to issue increased
punishments for repeat, violent offenders. 16 2 Not only does this
crossover help to assuage any concerns that habitual violent offenders
would not be punished for their recurrent criminal activity, but it also
provides a starting point for Congress to augment the enumerated
violent offenses in section 4B1.2(a) if it finds the current list of violent
crimes subject to a sentence enhancement incomplete.
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2012)
(enumerating as a violent crime "any offense under federal or state law ... that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or .. . threatened use of physical force against ... another,
or is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives"), and id
§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (supplementing the enumerated offenses from section 4B1.2(a) by
including as violent crimes "murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses, robbery[J .. . extortionate extension of credit[, . . . [and u]nlawfully
possessing a firearm described in 26 U.S.C § 5845(a) (2006) (e.g., a sawed-off shotgun or
sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun")), with 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2006) (requiring
mandatory life imprisonment for "a person who is convicted in a court of the United
States of a serious violent felony" and defining a serious violent felony as "a Federal or
State offense... consisting of murder," "manslaughter other than involuntary
manslaughter," "assault with intent to commit murder," "assault with intent to commit
rape," "aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse," "abusive sexual contact,"
"kidnapping," "aircraft piracy," "robbery," "carjacking," "extortion," "arson," "firearms
use," "firearms possession," "or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the
above offenses," and "any other offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment
of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another").
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Finally, this proposed rewrite has the added benefit of
eliminating the increased discretion afforded sentencing judges in
light of the post-Booker advisory nature of the Sentencing
Guidelines. This rewritten version of section 4B1.2(a)(2) would
effectively require the sentencing judge to answer "yes" or "no" to
whether the committed offense is a violent crime. Either the crime
"(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a
dwelling, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives," 63 or it
does not. There is no middle ground. However, the Guidelines as
currently written give the sentencing judge the discretion to answer
"maybe" under the residual clause and impute his or her preferred
sentencing philosophy into the determination as to whether the crime
is violent."
CONCLUSION
In Mobley, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly concluded that
possession of a shank by an inmate is a crime of violence subject to an
enhanced sentence under the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Mobley majority wrongly
used a utilitarian sentencing philosophy to reach this conclusion, and
it was able to do so against the purpose of the Guidelines because of
their post-Booker discretionary nature. The issue faced by the Mobley
court is not limited to the Fourth Circuit, but rather contributes to a
larger circuit split focused on the ambiguous nature of the residual
clause. Furthermore, this circuit split exemplifies the trouble faced by
lower courts when deciding whether particular, unenumerated crimes
are indeed "violent crimes" as intended by Congress.
Finally, the unresolved ambiguity present in the residual clause
of section 4B1.2(a)(2) is particularly unsettling because it infringes on
the constitutional right of notice embodied in the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Until Congress imputes the necessary
clarity that the residual clause calls out for by eliminating that clause
from the Sentencing Guidelines, defendants like Mobley will continue
to hope that courts correctly apply the rule of lenity, a stopgap
measure in the face of uncertainty in sentencing as the courts make
impromptu judgments as to what constitutes a "violent crime."
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2).
164. See supra Part I.
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